Does work experience mitigate discrimination? by Baert, Stijn et al.
 1 
Does Work Experience Mitigate 
Discrimination?* 
 
Stijn Baert,i Andrea Albanese,ii Sofie du Gardein,iii Jolien Ovaere,iv and Jarno Stappersv 
 
Abstract 
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1 Introduction 
Employing extensive field experiments, during the past decade, scholars have shown that 
discrimination is still a barrier for ethnic minorities in the labour market (Baert et al., 2015; 
Baert & Vujić, 2016; Booth et al., 2012; Carlsson & Rooth, 2007; Kaas & Manger, 2012; 
Neumark, In press). Identifying ethnic discrimination is, however, one thing; tackling it is 
another. To effectively combat labour market discrimination against ethnic minorities, 
one needs to understand its driving factors. In other words, to design adequate policy 
actions, targeted to the right employers in the proper way, one has to gain insight into 
when in particular (and why) employers discriminate. One such key factor by which 
discrimination might be heterogeneous is job candidates’ work experience. 
Arrow’s (1973) seminal model of statistical discrimination predicts a negative 
association between hiring discrimination and work experience. Statistical discrimination 
occurs as a time-efficient and profit-maximising response to low information (and, ipso 
facto, uncertainty) about the actual productivity of individual job candidates. Under 
asymmetric information, employers take into account their perception about the relative 
productivity-related characteristics of minorities as a group to predict a particular 
minority applicant’s productivity. If this kind of discrimination is indeed underlying the 
unfavourable treatment of ethnic minorities, it is expected to be lower among 
experienced job candidates. Successful work experience might be used as an uncertainty-
reducing device (or, stated otherwise, as a signal of the true level of productivity of the 
individual) and, therefore, mitigate discrimination.1,2 
This study is the first to focus on the empirical association between hiring 
                                                     
1 Conversely, work experience may also be affected by discrimination. Due to unfavourable treatment it might be harder 
for minority workers to acquire the same amount of experience as majority workers. This means that the same years of 
experience might signal different abilities and engagement in otherwise equal candidates. 
2 In addition, as argued by a reviewer of a former version of this article, employers might also perceive work experience as 
a signal of adaptation to the labour market and – by extension – as a signal of assimilation to the (mainstream) society. This 
signal might buffer the negative signals – and, thereby, statistical discrimination – related to belonging to an ethnic minority 
(Baert et al., 2016; Bisin et al., 2011; Constant & Zimmermann, 2008).  
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discrimination and job candidates’ work experience. To this end, we conduct a 
correspondence experiment. In this experiment, ethnic origin and work experience are 
randomly assigned to fictitious job candidates who apply for genuine vacancies. We then 
compare the callback from employers by ethnic minority status and years of work 
experience. In addition, the design of our experiment allows us to look into heterogeneity 
in discrimination by other candidate and vacancy characteristics such as specific ethnic 
origin, gender, education level, firm size and labour market tightness. 
2 Data 
We conducted our experiment between December 2015 and May 2016 in Flanders 
(Belgium). To this end, we created two templates (“Type A” and “Type B”) of curricula 
vitae for 10 middle-educated and 10 high-educated profiles of job candidates. Middle-
educated (high-educated) pairs held a secondary education degree (bachelor’s degree) in 
one out of 10 popular fields of study.3 Type A and Type B applications were different in 
layout and inessential details but identical in all job-relevant characteristics, conditional 
on education level. They were born and living in Ghent, the second largest city of Flanders. 
We submitted two applications, one of Type A and one of Type B, to 384 genuine 
vacancies for which one of our profiles was an adequate match. These were vacancies of 
employers on a list of 3751 firms operating in the region, as provided by the city of Ghent. 
They were randomly selected from the employers’ homepages or from the database of 
the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. One member of each candidate pair had a 
Flemish-sounding name (“native identity”) and the other one had a foreign sounding 
name (“immigrant identity”). To eliminate any application-type effects on callbacks, for 
                                                     
3 The middle-educated fields of study were social and technical sciences, electromechanics, electrics, nursing, health and 
wellbeing, tourism, reception and recreation, accountancy-informatics, administration, and public relations. The high-
educated fields of study were building, logistics, applied informatics, electromechanics, electronics, nursing, social work, 
finance and assurance, accountancy and tax, and marketing.  
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each vacancy, we alternately assigned the native and immigrant identity to the Type A 
and Type B applications (“within-pair randomisation”).  
Concerning the foreign sounding name used within the pair, we did not stick to one 
foreign background – as the aforementioned field experiments on ethnic discrimination 
except for Booth et al. (2012) did – but alternated over typically Turkish, Moroccan, 
Slovakian and Ghanaian names.4 These names were provided by the administration of the 
city of Ghent as being frequently used but non-stereotypical names among these ethnic 
minorities. All the pairs had the Belgian nationality to avoid unequal treatment due to 
administrative reasons.5 
Importantly, we alternated over three kinds of pairs with respect to work experience: 
pairs in which both members (native and non-native members) had 0, 10 or 20 years of 
labour market experience (in an occupation comparable to the job mentioned in the 
vacancy).6 This “between-pair randomisation” of work experience allows us to investigate 
whether hiring discrimination against candidates with a foreign background is, indeed, 
heterogeneous by their work experience. In addition, we alternated the gender of the 
candidate pairs.  
We submitted the resulting combinations to employers in an alternating order, with 
approximately 24 hours in between the pair members. Callbacks were received by 
telephone voicemail or email. In line with the aforementioned literature, we define 
                                                     
4 Testing discrimination against multiple ethnic minorities enables us to avoid the danger inherent to many earlier 
correspondence studies in which researchers selected only one minority suffering, potentially, from an unrepresentatively 
high (or low) level of discrimination. 
5 The Belgian nationality can be obtained relatively easily after some years of residence in Belgium (OECD, 2008).  
6 As our candidates did not mention any unemployment spells, the candidates without experience were graduates (being 
18 years old when middle-educated and 21 years old when high-educated), while the candidates with 10 and 20 years of 
experience were 10 and 20 years older, respectively. When interpreting our results as evidence for the relation between 
hiring discrimination and work experience, we implicitly assume that ethnic discrimination is homogeneous by age. If one 
is not willing to make this assumption, the empirical pattern discussed in Section 3 should be interpreted as the combined 
effect of work experience and (older) age. Alternatively, we could have fixed the age of our candidates and varied the years 
of inactivity or unemployment between the pairs to create variation in years of experience. However, we believe that it is 
more tenable to assume that ethnic discrimination is homogeneous by age than to assume that it is homogeneous by years 
of unemployment (likely signalling different skill level).  
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positive callback as getting an invitation for a job interview concerning the job announced 
in the vacancy. 
3 Results 
Table 1 summarises our experimentally gathered data. Overall, the native identity within 
our experiment received an invitation to a job interview in 11.2% of his applications,7 
while his immigrant counterpart got an invitation in only 7.8% of the cases.8 In line with 
the literature, we calculate the positive callback ratio (PCR) by dividing the invitation rate 
of the immigrant candidate by the corresponding rate of the native candidate. This yields 
a PCR of 0.698: the immigrant candidate received about 30.2% fewer invitations. This PCR 
is significantly different from 1 at the 1% level.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
When we break down the data by the years of relevant work experience mentioned 
by the candidate pair, we find that the PCR varies with this experience in the expected 
direction. Immigrant graduates and immigrants with 10 years of experience received 
50.0% and 35.7% fewer invitations, respectively, than native graduates with the same 
experience. The related PCRs are significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. In sharp 
contrast, the PCR is slightly higher than (but not statistically significantly different from) 1 
when comparing immigrants and natives with 20 years of experience. So, we cannot reject 
equal treatment of natives and immigrants when they are really experienced. 
As we assigned foreign origin and work experience to the applications in a random 
(alternating) way, regressing positive callback on interaction terms between these two 
candidate aspects should lead to exactly the same statistical results, at least for a sample 
                                                     
7 11.2% = (24+19)/384. 
8 Both callback rates are comparable to those measured in former correspondence experiments. In particular, these 
numbers corroborate with those of the recent Flemish correspondence experiment discussed in Baert and Vujić (2016). The 
Flemish (Turkish) candidate in their experiment got an invitation in 9.7% (6.4%) of his applications. 
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size going to infinity. However, our sample is finite. Therefore, the work experience of our 
candidates may correlate with observable and unobservable vacancy characteristics.9 
Therefore, we present a regression analysis controlling for various sets of observables at 
the vacancy level and for vacancy fixed effects.10 
Table 2 presents the estimates for four regression models. In model (1), the invitation 
outcome is regressed on an indicator of having a foreign name and two interactions 
between this dummy and indicators for 10 and 20 years of work experience.11,12 In line 
with the discussed PCRs in Table 1,13 we find that a foreign name lowers the invitation 
probability with 7.0 percentage points for the reference category of graduates. For 
candidates with 10 years of experience this penalty shrimps to 3.9 percentage points,14 
while for candidates with 20 years of experience, this penalty even becomes 
insignificantly negative (-0.8 percentage points). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
As the estimates of model (1) point, to some extent, in the direction of a linear 
relationship between ethnic discrimination and years of experience, in model (2) we 
replace the interaction terms of model (1) with an interaction between the immigrant 
dummy and a continuous variable capturing the years of work experience. By doing this, 
we find that the immigrant penalty in the invitation chance decreases for each year of 
work experience by 0.4 percentage points (or about 5.5 percent).15 
                                                     
9 These vacancy characteristics may affect hiring chances. As a consequence, not controlling for them might yield biased 
measures of the heterogeneity of ethnic discrimination by the candidates’ work experience. 
10 Regression analyses including random effects at the vacancy level and logistic regressions yield the same conclusions (and 
are available upon request). 
11 As a consequence, the reference category (for which the effect is captured by the immigrant dummy) is being an 
immigrant with no work experience. 
12 As we control for vacancy fixed effects, any impact of experience (which is constant within the pair) without interaction 
with immigrant status is controlled. 
13 As the vacancy fixed effect does not matter much, our between-pair randomisation of work experience seems to have 
been successful. 
14 As can be seen from Table 2, however, the interaction between the indicators of immigrant status and 10 years of 
experience is not statistically significant from the reference category (i.e., an immigrant with no work experience). 
15 0.055 = 0.004/-0.073. In other words, given the estimated parameters, the immigration penalty becomes zero after about 
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Finally, in models (3) and (4), interactions between being an immigrant and other 
candidate characteristics (dummies indicating Turkish, Moroccan or Ghanaian origin, 
female gender and being high-educated) and vacancy characteristics (customer contact 
in the job,16 bottleneck status of the occupation,17 being posted by a medium or big firm,18 
selected from the primary, secondary or tertiary sector19 and selected from a sector with 
a high fraction of immigrants20) are included, respectively. However, the introduction of 
these variables hardly affects the regression coefficients of main interest. In addition, in 
line with Booth et al. (2012), we find that hiring discrimination fundamentally varies 
across ethnic minorities: our invitation outcome is significantly more adverse for Turkish 
and Ghanaian candidates compared to the reference category of Slovakians. Moreover, 
we find, in line with Carlsson and Rooth (2007) and Kaas and Manger (2012), more 
discriminatory behaviour by smaller firms.  
4 Conclusion 
We contributed to the literature on labour market discrimination by investigating the 
                                                     
18 years of work experience (18.3 = -0.073/0.004). 
16 This variable is 1 when being customer-oriented is mentioned as a required skill in the vacancy (and 0 otherwise). 
17 A bottleneck occupation is an occupation in which the labour market tightness is high. Following Baert et al. (2015), we 
first matched each vacancy with an occupation in the classification list of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. For 
each of the occupations in this list, we then looked up their bottleneck status, which is each year assigned by the Public 
Employment Agency of Flanders by combining three statistical criteria with respect to tightness in the occupation, for 2015. 
18 We follow the European Commission’s division of firms in micro and small firms (less than 50 workers) and (middle-)large 
firms (50 or more workers). A proxy of the number of workers of each firm tested was obtained in two steps. First, we 
looked up the company number of each firm in the database of the Flemish business magazine “Trends”. Second, the 
average number of workers in the firm in 2010 was searched for in the Bel-first database (Bureau Van Dijk). 
19 For this variable, we used the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (“NACE”) at the 
2-digit-level. This sector code was found in the database of the Flemish business magazine “Trends”. Subsequently, we 
clustered the sectors in the (i) primary or secondary sector, (ii) tertiary sector and (iii) quaternary sector. 
20 Following Baert et al. (2015), a sector with a high fraction of immigrants was defined as a NACE-sector with at least 3% 
workers with a non-Western nationality on 31 December 2009 (data provided by the Datawarehouse of the Belgian federal 
public service of social security). 
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relationship between unequal treatment in hiring and work experience. To this end, we 
sent out fictitious job applications in which foreign origin and relevant experience were 
randomly mentioned. Based on our analysis of the tested employers’ callback, and in line 
with our theoretical expectations, we conclude that work experience substantially 
mitigates ethnic discrimination in hiring, at least in Belgium. In addition, our analyses 
suggest that ethnic discrimination varies across ethnic groups and that small firms 
discriminate more than larger ones. Based on our main result, and in line with the 
recommendations in OECD (2008),21 we are in favour of anti-discrimination policies (such 
as assisting individuals who feel discriminated against in filing a complaint) targeted at 
graduates from (ethnic) minorities. They do not only have to cope with higher levels of 
discrimination per se but hiring discrimination at young age might also stand in the way 
the acquisition of work experience which is an asset to avoid discrimination (and be 
successful in the labour market) later. 
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Table 1. Invitation Probability by Ethnic Origin and Experience: Descriptive Analysis. 













Full sample 384 (768) 335 24 19 6 0.698*** 2.620 
Pairs without work experience 128 (256) 108 7 11 2 0.500** 2.549 
Pairs with 10 years of experience 128 (256) 114 9 5 0 0.643** 2.272 
Pairs with 20 years of experience 128 (256) 113 8 3 4 1.091 0.377 
In line with the literature, we calculate the positive callback ratio (PCR) by dividing the percentage of applications for which immigrant candidates received an invitation by the corresponding 
percentage for the native candidates. The t‐test for the PCR tests the null hypothesis that these percentages are the same for the candidates from both groups. Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. *** (**; *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%; 10%) level. 
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Table 2. Invitation Probability by Ethnic Origin and Experience: Regression Analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) Immigrant -0.070** (0.028) -0.073*** (0.024) -0.073*** (0.024) -0.071*** (0.024) 
(b) Immigrant x 10 years of experience 0.031 (0.032)    
(c) Immigrant x 20 years of experience 0.078** (0.034)    
(d) Immigrant x Years of experience  0.004** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 
(e) Immigrant x Turkish (normalised)   -0.073** (0.031) -0.079** (0.033) 
(f) Immigrant x Moroccan (normalised)   -0.042 (0.033) -0.045 (0.034) 
(g) Immigrant x Ghanaian (normalised)   -0.062* (0.036) -0.061* (0.036) 
(h) Immigrant x Female (normalised)   0.015 (0.025) 0.018 (0.024) 
(i) Immigrant x High-educated (normalised)   0.001 (0.033) -0.001 (0.033) 
(j) Immigrant x Vacancy with customer contact (normalised)    0.002 (0.029) 
(k) Immigrant x Vacancy for bottleneck occupation (normalised)    0.031 (0.029) 
(l) Immigrant x Vacancy in medium or big firm (normalised)    0.052** (0.025) 
(l) Immigrant x Vacancy in primary or secondary sector (normalised)    0.023 (0.046) 
(l) Immigrant x Vacancy in tertiary sector (normalised)    0.002 (0.042) 
(o) Immigrant x Vacancy in sector with high fraction of immigrants (normalised)    -0.010 (0.029) 
(p) Constant 0.112*** (0.006) 0.112*** (0.006) 0.112*** (0.006) 0.112*** (0.006) 
Vacancy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 768 768 768 768 
The presented statistics are linear probability model estimates. The dependent variable is getting an invitation to a job interview. Variables (e) – (o) are normalised by subtracting their mean among 
the subpopulation of immigrants. As we control for vacancy fixed effects, any impact of the mentioned variables without interaction with immigrant status is controlled. Standard errors, corrected 
for clustering at the vacancy level, are between parentheses. *** (**; *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%; 10%) level. 
 
